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Jörg Löschke 
The Duty of the Patient to Cooperate 
Abstract: In discussing the normative implications of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, medical ethics has mostly focused on the duties of doctors to their 
patients. This focus neglects an important normative dimension of the doctor-
patient-relationship, namely the duties of patients to doctors. Only few authors 
have discussed the content and ground of the moral duties of patients, and each 
of these accounts are wanting in some way. This paper discusses patients’ du-
ties and argues that patients have a relationship-dependent obligation to coop-
erate with the doctor, because doctors have a morally justified interest in ful-
filling their moral role obligations as doctors, and by not cooperating, patients 
make it more difficult for doctors to fulfill their moral obligations. In some cas-
es, failing to cooperate might even create an avoidable moral dilemma for the 
doctor. 
Keywords: Patients’ Duties, Doctors’ Duties, Role Obligations, Doctor-Patient 
Relationship, Principlism 
1 Introduction 
Medical ethics has a clear focus. For the most part it discusses the rights of pa-
tients and the accompanying duties of doctors and other health care workers. 
This focus seems justified – after all, patients are especially vulnerable, both 
because of their predicament and their dependency, and it is important to pro-
tect that vulnerability. At the same time, the focus on the rights of patients and 
the duties of doctors has led to neglect of the possible duties of patients to their 
doctors and other health care workers. While the possible duties of patients 
have not been entirely ignored in the literature,1 the topic certainly remains 
underexplored.2 
This is unsatisfactory. An important task of medical ethics is to analyze the 
normative complexity of the various relationships within a specific health care 
system – relationships such as the relationship between doctors and patients, 
|| 
1 For an overview of the few texts that discuss the duties of patients, see Kangasniemi et al. 
2012. 
2 Cf. Meyer 1992. Not much has changed since the publication of that essay. 
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nurses and patients, patients and patients, or even patients and other stake-
holders within the health care system such as tax payers. These different kinds 
of relationships all bear normative significance, and to come to a justified 
judgment concerning the duties that arise within these relationships one must 
analyze the relevant normative considerations that apply to them. While the 
rights of patients and the accompanying duties of doctors are very important 
considerations within the normative web of a healthcare system, they are cer-
tainly not the only considerations that count. To fully grasp the normativity of 
health care, more work needs to be done. An analysis of patients’ duties is part 
of that work, and is relevant for various debates in medical ethics. 
For example, some authors criticize what they see as a one-sided focus on 
the autonomy of patients within medical ethics.3 Understanding patients as 
bearers not only of moral rights but also of moral duties also emphasizes their 
autonomy, albeit a neglected aspect of it;4 at the same time, the grounds of pa-
tients’ duties might very well show that it is misleading to focus merely on pa-
tients’ autonomy when analyzing the normative implications of the doctor-
patient relationship. As I will argue, duties of patients are derivative of the du-
ties of doctors, but the relevant duties of doctors are not exhausted by their duty 
to respect the autonomy of their patients. If this is correct, it follows that the 
autonomy of patients is not the only relevant normative consideration that ap-
plies to the doctor-patient relationship. 
The question of possible moral duties of patients is relevant for other de-
bates too. How should we understand the doctor-patient relationship? As a 
hierarchical relationship, as a partnership with a more egalitarian structure, or 
as a relationship between service-provider and customer? Is it appropriate to 
commercialize the healthcare system? How much self-responsibility can we 
demand from members of a healthcare system? The answers to these questions 
depend (among other things) on whether patients have duties to their doctors, 
and if they do, on what grounds. 
Hence, exploring patients’ duties is a worthwhile endeavor. In what fol-
lows, I will argue that patients do have a duty to cooperate with their doctors, 
and I will offer a novel argument for this claim. This is a fairly modest task. I do 
not attempt to offer a full account of patients’ duties, since such an account 
would also have to discuss the duties that patients have to all stakeholders 
within a specific healthcare system, and that task is too great for a single paper. 
The duty that I am interested in is a duty that stems from the doctor-patient 
|| 
3 See, for example, Foster 2009; Schneider 1998; O’Neill 2002. 
4 I will discuss this aspect in more detail below. 
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relationship, and this leaves open the possibility that patients also have duties 
to other stakeholders. 
I will proceed as follows. First, I analyze the doctor-patient relationship to 
get a better understanding of its distinct normativity. I will then discuss some 
prominent accounts of patients’ duties and argue that each of them fails to cap-
ture important aspects. In a third step, I offer a novel account, according to 
which patients have a duty to cooperate because doctors have a justified inter-
est in fulfilling their moral role obligations. I close with some concluding re-
marks. 
2 The normative complexity of the doctor-patient 
relationship 
I understand the duties of patients as duties that stem from the doctor-patient 
relationship.5 This relationship is normatively complex, for several reasons. 
Most importantly, doctors are asked to make complex decisions when interact-
ing with their patients, as they have to take several aspects into account that 
ought to govern their actions. The influential principlist account of Beauchamp 
and Childress6 expresses this complexity: according to this account, four moral 
principles are relevant for doctors when interacting with their patients, namely 
respect for the patient’s autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 
These principles cannot be reduced to one overarching meta-principle of bio-
medical ethics. Rather, they can conflict, and such conflicts might even amount 
to moral dilemmas, which is one reason why the doctor-patient relationship is 
normatively complex. Other factors also add to this normative complexity: the 
patient’s age, the seriousness of his situation, or decisions regarding third par-
ties all influence the doctor’s decisions regarding what action to take, without a 
|| 
5 Very generally speaking, a moral duty is a “sufficient moral reason to do or refrain from 
doing something” (Seglow 2013, 6). In other words, whenever an agent has a moral duty, this 
fact by itself can explain why she ought to do something. But duties can be more or less strin-
gent. William David Ross 1930 distinguishes prima facie duties from actual duties: a prima 
facie duties holds as long as it is not outweighed by other relevant considerations. By contrast, 
an actual duty is an all-things-considered judgment about what an agent ought to do in a given 
situation. Hence, prima facie duties contribute to the actual duty of an agent, but these kinds of 
duty need not be identical. The duty of a patient to cooperate is to be understood as a prima 
facie duty: it can be outweighed by other relevant considerations. 
6 Cf. Beauchamp, Childress 2012. 
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clear criterion for how to weigh such factors. To say that the doctor-patient rela-
tionship is normatively complex is to say that doctors face complex decisions. 
But this is not the only dimension of complexity within the doctor-patient 
relationship. Personal relationships as such have an inherent normativity inso-
far as they imply rights and duties of all parties involved – the only exception 
being the relationship between parents and their very young children. Another 
dimension of complexity thus arises because all of the participants within rela-
tionships owe duties to each other. 
One might think that talking of patients’ duties is out of place, for the rea-
son already mentioned: patients are the vulnerable part of the doctor-patient 
relationship, and it seems more important to protect that vulnerability than to 
talk about their duties. However, while it is true that patients are the vulnerable 
part of the relationship, it does not follow that they bear no duties. In fact, there 
seem to be good reasons to think of patients as bearers of obligations, the most 
important being the patient’s autonomy.7 One of the moral principles that ap-
plies to the doctor is the duty to respect the patient’s autonomy, and this is im-
portant because it avoids hierarchical conceptions of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship according to which the patient is a helpless person who needs others to 
look after her good. However, the autonomy of an agent not only grounds rights 
of that agent, but also duties. Generally speaking, the autonomy of an agent is 
both a necessary and a sufficient condition for her being the bearer of moral 
obligations, and to understand the patient as an autonomous part of the doctor-
patient relationship therefore implies understanding her as a responsible partic-
ipant of that relationship too – as a person who can be held accountable for her 
actions. If one thinks that respect for the patient’s autonomy is an important 
principle in medical ethics, one that grounds patients’ rights and doctors’ du-
ties, one should also take seriously the idea that patients are bearers of moral 
duties. 
To sum up, two considerations support the idea that patients have duties: 
first, the fact that the doctor-patient relationship has normative significance, 
and second, the fact that the autonomy of patients must be taken seriously. 
However, while these considerations suggest that patients have duties, they do 
not elucidate the grounds and content of those duties. Relationships have a 
distinct normativity, since their participants owe each other so-called associa-
tive duties, not merely in virtue of their humanity, but in virtue of their relation-
|| 
7 Meyer 1992. 
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ship.8 But even if such duties exist in virtue of the relationship, their exact 
grounds and content can differ, depending on the kind of relationship that 
grounds them. One must analyze the normativity of a given kind of relationship 
in order to determine what the participants owe to each other, and thus, one 
cannot fully understand the duties of patients without analyzing the specific 
characteristics of the doctor-patient relationship. 
3 The doctor-patient relationship 
Most authors assume that associative duties stem from the intrinsic value of the 
relationship that gives rise to them, where the intrinsic value of a relationship 
consists in that relationship contributing directly to the flourishing or the well-
being of the participants.9 In other words, the participants take part in such 
relationships not because doing so helps them to achieve some goal that is exte-
rior to the relationship, but rather because participating in these relationships is 
considered worthwhile in itself: a person who engages in a friendship not for 
the relationship’s sake, but to achieve fame or wealth, is no real friend. Howev-
er, the doctor-patient relationship is not intrinsically valuable in the way that 
friendships or romantic partnerships are. Patients do not enter a doctor-patient 
relationship because they regard it as worthwhile in itself – rather, they do so 
because they have a medical problem and need help. 
Given that it is not intrinsically valuable in the same way as personal rela-
tionships such as friendships or romantic partnerships, one might think that the 
duties arising from a doctor-patient relationship can be reduced to duties stem-
ming from contractual relationships. But this seems implausible. Contractual 
relationships are valuable, but only instrumentally, and this is why such a re-
duction fails to capture the normativity of the doctor-patient relationship. While 
it is true that a doctor-patient relationship is instrumentally valuable (especially 
for the patient), it differs in an important respect from other contractual rela-
tionships, as it can shape the identities of the participants profoundly. People 
are typically quite indifferent to their contractual relationships, but their status 
as a doctor or as a patient can be an important part of their self-understanding. 
|| 
8 For different versions of this view, see, among others, Scheffler 2002; Kolodny 2003; Seglow 
2013. 
9 This does not contradict the claim that the exact grounds of relationship-dependent duties 
can differ, depending on the relationship in question – after all, the reason why certain rela-
tionships contribute to the well-being of their participants can differ. 
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The doctor-patient relationship is a relationship that is not intrinsically val-
uable, but that can nevertheless shape the identities of the parties involved. 
This seems to be best captured by characterizing the doctor-patient-relationship 
as one of mutually dependent social roles.10 Social roles are often (at least part-
ly) constitutive of the role-bearer’s identity. Therefore, understanding the doc-
tor-patient-relationship in terms of social roles explains why one’s own stand-
ing in such a relationship, either as a doctor or as a patient, can (partly) shape 
one’s self-understanding. At the same time, people do not necessarily occupy 
social roles because they consider this worthwhile in itself, and this explains 
why the doctor-patient relationship is not intrinsically valuable. 
It is important to see that the roles of doctor and patient are not free-
standing but mutually dependent: the one cannot exist without the other – one 
cannot occupy the role of a doctor without somebody occupying the role of a 
patient, and at the same time, a patient is not merely a sick person, but a sick 
person seeking help from a doctor. Thus, the roles of doctor and patient mutual-
ly depend on each other – I will return to this point. 
Understanding the doctor-patient relationship in terms of social roles ex-
plains the relationship’s inherent normativity, because social roles are norma-
tive concepts: they imply role obligations.11 These obligations are not static; 
rather, role obligations depend on socially shared understandings of what it 
means to be a bearer of the role in question. These shared understandings can 
change over time, and they can also change within a specific social context. In 
other words, roles are interpretative concepts:12 they must be interpreted, and a 
change in the shared understanding of a role can be described as a change in 
the paradigmatic interpretation of this role. The doctor-patient-relationship 
exemplifies such a change. The roles of doctor and patient used to be interpret-
|| 
10 For an account of the doctor–patient relationship in terms of social roles, see also Parsons 
1951; 1975. Parsons thinks that patients have a role-related obligation to cooperate with their 
doctors. However, his view differs from the one developed in this paper in an important regard: 
Parsons understands the obligations of the “sick role” as obligations whose function it is to 
deal with deviant behavior, thereby stabilizing a social system. By contrast, the focus of this 
paper is the moral grounds of the patient’s obligation to cooperate with the doctor. 
11 Hardimon 1994. It is important to stress at this point that role-obligations are not necessari-
ly moral obligations. It is possible to analyze the role obligations of women within patriarchic 
societies, without thereby showing – or even claiming – that such obligations are morally 
justified. However, some role obligations are moral obligations – one might even understand 
certain social roles as means to discharge moral requirements. And at least some of the role 
obligations of physicians belong to this category. I will return to this point below. 
12 Cf. Dworkin 1986. 
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ed in terms of the authority of the doctor and the obedience of the patient, but 
this has gradually changed to an understanding of the doctor-patient relation-
ship in terms of a partnership.13 
To conclude, the relationship between patient and doctor must be under-
stood as a relationship of mutually dependent social roles. This understanding 
explains not only the duties of doctors, but also the duties of patients to their 
doctors, in particular a duty to cooperate – or so I will argue. 
Before I will develop this thought, let me first discuss some accounts of pa-
tients’ duties that can be found in the literature. They each identify a duty to 
cooperate with the doctor, but they all seem insufficient in one way or another. 
4 Patients’ duties: insufficient accounts 
One might think that the duty to cooperate with the doctor is a duty that the 
patient owes to herself, rather than to the doctor or to some other party – after 
all, it is her health or well-being that is at stake.14 But this does not seem con-
vincing. First, it is hard to see how others can hold a person accountable for 
violating a self-regarding duty. But when a patient fails to cooperate with her 
doctor, there seem to be grounds for holding her accountable, even if it might 
not be immediately clear who has the standing to hold her accountable and on 
what grounds. Second, if the duty to cooperate were a self-directed duty, the 
patient would also have a self-regarding duty to seek help from a doctor in the 
first place. If patients owe it to themselves to cooperate with the doctor because 
their health is at stake, then surely they also owe it to themselves to seek help 
from a doctor. But there seems to be a normatively relevant difference between 
failing to seek help from a doctor and failing to cooperate with the doctor, once 
one has sought help from her.15 
Michael J. Meyer argues that doctors and patients share a “commitment to 
the practice of bilateral decision-making”16. According to Meyer, this practice 
constitutes an ethically relevant relationship, and the duties of patients are 
|| 
13 Meyer 1992, 545. 
14 I am not aware of any author who actually holds this position; I only mention it to set it 
aside.  
15 I thank an anonymous referee for making me aware of the need to explain why the patient’s 
duty to cooperate should not be understood as a self-regarding duty. 
16 Meyer 1992, 545. 
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“duties born of that partnership”17. These duties consist in various kinds of co-
operation – being honest, collecting information on treatments and side-effects, 
and taking measures to avoid the transmission of an infectious disease. By ful-
filling these duties, the patient proves to be a cooperating partner in the rela-
tionship. 
Understanding the relationship between patient and doctor as a relation-
ship of bilateral decision-making and as the source of (at least some of) the 
patient’ duties is quite plausible. However, this claim does not elucidate the 
exact grounds of those duties: different kinds of relationships (and different 
kinds of partnerships) ground duties in quite different ways. The justification of 
duties within intrinsically valuable relationships (or partnerships) differs from 
the justification of such duties within merely instrumentally valuable relation-
ships. And this marks an important difference: for example, duties of friendship 
hold (at least to a degree) even if the other party of the relationship has failed to 
fulfill her obligations, whereas duties of business partnerships can cease as 
soon as the other party fails to fulfill her obligations. Hence, an account that 
grounds the duties of patients within the doctor-patient relationship must ex-
plain in what exact way this relationship grounds duties, and this is why Mey-
er’s account is insufficient. 
Heather Draper and Tom Sorell identify several duties that fall to patients, 
including a duty to cooperate. They ground this duty in the combination of two 
considerations: a general duty to follow advice one has asked for (as long as the 
patient genuinely agrees with it), and considerations of fairness. However, nei-
ther of these considerations seems to ground patients’ duties to cooperate. 
According to Draper and Sorell, the first consideration arises from a specific 
sort of moral practice, namely the “rules of situations in which people seek and 
are given medical advice”18. The authors see a duty to cooperate as stemming 
from a general rule in counseling relationships: when an agent asks for advice, 
he ought to follow it as long as he has good reason to believe that the advice-
giver puts his interests first. And the authors understand this as a moral re-
quirement. 
However, it is not clear that such a general moral requirement exists. If it 
were, the advice-seeker would be answerable to the advice-giver when he fails 
to follow the advice – in other words, he would owe the advice-giver some ex-
planation or apology. But there are many cases in which a person who fails to 
follow advice is not answerable to his advice-giver, even if he acts imprudently. 
|| 
17 Meyer 1992, 547. 
18 Draper, Sorell 2002, 346. 
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For example, if I meet a stranger in a bar and learn that he is a financial expert, I 
might ask him for advice on how to invest my money.19 But it certainly does not 
follow that I have a moral obligation to follow his advice, or that I ought to 
apologize to him if I decide not to follow his advice. Hence, even if a patient has 
a moral obligation to follow advice he has asked for, this obligation does not 
stem from a general moral rule according to which persons who ask for advice 
have an obligation to follow it. 
The second consideration claims that the doctor-patient relationship can be 
unjust for the doctor, since she cannot unilaterally end the relationship, even if 
the patient fails to follow her advice. The patient, on the other hand, can unilat-
erally end the relationship. This leads to the danger of the doctor becoming a 
“captive helper”20. Draper and Sorell argue that this constitutes a specific form 
of unfairness. Accordingly, the patient’s duty to cooperate exists because by 
cooperating, the patient reduces this specific kind of unfairness. 
An obvious objection to this argument, as Draper and Sorell themselves 
recognize, is that “doctors enter the profession knowing that there will be diffi-
cult patients, including patients who repeatedly ignore important medical ad-
vice”21. Since doctors are aware of this possibility when they choose their pro-
fession, it does not seem unfair that doctors cannot end the relationship in the 
same way as patients. 
Against this possible objection, Draper and Sorell argue that “the fact that a 
kind of behaviour is to be expected is not justification of the behaviour”22. They 
use the division of labor between men and women as an example to support this 
claim: women used to have to expect an unfair division of labor after marriage 
and knew this before entering a marriage. However, this did not justify this 
unjust practice. 
While it is true that the fact that women had to expect an unfair division of 
labor does not justify this arrangement, it is less clear that the example rebuts 
the objection against the “captive helper” argument. As was argued before, 
roles are interpretative concepts, and the roles of husband and wife used to be 
interpreted in a way that assigned women a lower status. Hence, there was a 
moral requirement to re-interpret these roles in a more egalitarian way. But this 
does not apply to the doctor-patient relationship. Even if one considers it unfair 
that doctors cannot leave the relationship as freely as patients can, this does not 
|| 
19 See Darwall 2013. 
20 Draper, Sorell 2002, 346. 
21 Ibid., 348. 
22 Ibid. 
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 19.03.19 16:52
16 | Jörg Löschke 
  
imply a lower status on the part of doctors. Furthermore, it is not clear how to 
re-interpret the roles of patient and doctor accordingly. Either it would require 
limiting the possibility for patients to leave the relationship, which threatens 
their autonomy, or it would imply enabling doctors to end the relationship uni-
laterally, which increases patients’ vulnerability. Hence, the “captive helper” 
argument seems just as insufficient to ground patients’ duties as the argument 
from the moral duty to follow advice one has asked for. 
Stephen Buetow understands the duty to cooperate with the doctor as a dis-
chargeable moral debt that the patient owes the state: patients benefit from 
healthcare services provided by the state, and this grounds an obligation to help 
keep health costs to a minimum. Cooperation with the doctor is an indispensa-
ble means to this end.23 
As plausible as such considerations of fairness are, they fail to give a fully 
satisfactory account of patients’ duties. The argument assumes that the pa-
tient’s duty to cooperate is not a duty that is directed to the doctor, but rather to 
the state, even if the doctor figures in the content of that duty. The direction of a 
duty determines who can demand fulfillment of that duty, namely the party 
towards whom the duty is directed. On Buetow’s account, patients’ duties are 
owed to the state; hence, according to this account, the state or every member of 
the healthcare system can demand compliance with the doctor’s advice from 
the patient. In other words, not just the doctor, but any stranger has the authori-
ty to demand cooperation, as long as he is a representative of the shared 
healthcare system. But this seems wrong. Such a general standing to demand 
cooperation from patients seems to unduly interfere with the patient’s autono-
my: in a way, her behavior is none of a stranger’s business. Doctors might not 
be in the position to issue orders to the patient, but they do have a special nor-
mative authority to ask the patient to cooperate. Their standing to do so exceeds 
the standing of strangers – this simply follows from the assumption that pa-
tients’ duties stem from the doctor-patient relationship. But Buetow’s account 
cannot accommodate such special standing to demand cooperation. This is not 
to say that the normative web of a health care system does not also include 
duties of the patient to the state. It just means that this duty does not exhaust 
the patient’s duty to cooperate with the doctor. 
Martyn Evans identifies ten patients’ duties in total, three of which are du-
ties of cooperation: the duty of truthfulness, the duty of compliance, and the 
duty of recovery or maintenance. According to Evans, these duties are grounded 
|| 
23 Buetow 2005, 305. 
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in the “good of all other patients”24. His argument runs as follows: medical re-
sources are scarce; hence, a patient has an obligation to other patients to keep 
the resources used for his recovery to a minimum, and this amounts to a duty to 
cooperate with the doctor, as uncooperative patients waste resources that other 
patients need for their recovery. This argument seems quite similar to Buetow’s 
account, but the crucial difference concerns the directedness of the patients’ 
duties: they are owed to other patients, not to the state (or representatives or the 
shared health system). This difference in the directedness of patients’ duties 
does not solve the problem that arises for Buetow’s account, but rather makes it 
worse. According to Evans’ account, a doctor has no moral standing whatsoever 
to demand cooperation from the patient: he is a representative of the shared 
healthcare system, but he is not a patient. However, every other patient within 
that health care system has a justified claim on the patient’s behavior. Hence, 
Evans’s account also fails to show why a doctor has a special standing to de-
mand cooperation from the patient, and this means that it cannot elucidate an 
important part of the normative web of healthcare.25 
5 Patients’ duties 
A more satisfying account of the duty of patients to cooperate can be developed 
by taking seriously the idea that the doctor-patient relationship is a relationship 
of mutually dependent social roles. As a normative concept, the role of a patient 
implies obligations in a way that I will explain shortly. But first, it is necessary 
to discuss a possible objection against understanding patients’ duties as role 
obligations. 
Persons do not (usually) choose to be sick; hence, they do not voluntarily 
occupy the role of patient. Role obligations, the objection goes, might be justi-
fied when the role-bearer voluntarily takes over a role, as she then consents to 
the obligations. But role obligations that stem from roles that the role-bearer has 
not consented to can easily become oppressive. For example, in sexist societies, 
|| 
24 Evans 2007, 691. 
25 This is not to say that patients have no duty whatsoever to other members of their shared 
healthcare system. They might very well have such duties; and one of the reasons why patients 
have duties to doctors might implicitly assume that members of a certain healthcare system 
have duties to act so as to keep health care costs to a minimum. However, even if such duties 
exist, they do not fully account for the duties of patients to their doctors, as they do not appro-
priately focus on the doctor-patient relationship and its normative structure. 
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the role obligations that come with the role of a housewife can greatly violate 
the role-bearer’s right to an autonomous way of life. And insofar as a person 
does not choose to be sick, she does not consent to being a bearer of role obliga-
tions. Hence, one might think that any obligations that come with the role of a 
patient are also unjustified. 
This possible objection can be rebutted. From the fact that a person did not 
voluntarily take over a specific role, it does not follow that no normative consid-
erations apply to her in virtue of that role. As Michael Hardimon has argued, 
role obligations can also hold if the role-bearer can accept his non-voluntarily 
acquired role upon rational reflection.26 In other words, he must be able to judge 
the role as good, meaningful, or otherwise acceptable. And the role of a patient 
seems to meet this requirement. Of course, people do not typically judge their 
disease as good or meaningful. But the role of the patient is not equivalent to 
the role of being sick, since a patient is a sick person seeking help. And as a sick 
person, it is good for her that social practices exist which enable that person to 
seek help from qualified helpers. If the principle of reflective acceptability 
holds, the role of a patient can imply normative requirements that hold even if 
the role-bearer does not occupy the role voluntarily. 
However, these considerations only support the idea that patients have role 
obligations, which is just to say that patients are subject to social expectations. 
They do not tell us the exact content of such obligations – and they do not show 
that they are moral obligations. Not all role obligations are moral obligations.27 
For example, a football coach has role obligations such as not making a substi-
tution in the last minute of the game if his team is trailing by one goal and needs 
every second to score. But this is not a moral obligation. The question, then, is 
whether the role obligations of patients are in fact moral obligations, or whether 
they are just non-moral social expectations. 
At this point, it is important to remember that the roles of patient and doctor 
are mutually dependent. Nevertheless, the doctor’s role has conceptual priority 
– this follows from the fact that a patient is a sick person seeking help from a 
doctor. The role of the doctor is necessary to turn a person with a disease into a 
patient: the role of a patient can only exist if the role of a doctor exists. Howev-
er, the role of a doctor not only has conceptual priority, but also a specific kind 
of normative priority, and this explains why the role obligations of patients are 
moral obligations. 
|| 
26 See Hardimon 1994. 
27 Cf. Sciaraffa 2011. 
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To see this, consider first the role obligations of doctors. Some role obliga-
tions of doctors are not genuinely moral in character – a doctor might be ex-
pected to attend board meetings, but this is a non-moral obligation. But other 
role obligations of doctors are clearly moral in character. For example, the 
aforementioned principles of biomedical ethics identified by Beauchamp and 
Childress can be understood along these lines. Respect for the patient’s auton-
omy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice are moral principles that define 
doctors’ duties to their patients, and as such, they define the obligations that 
doctors have to their patients as doctors. However, these principles not only 
explain the duties of doctors to patients, but also the duties of patients to doc-
tors – this is what the normative priority of the doctor’s role consists in. Let me 
explain. 
If an agent has a moral role obligation to do something, she also has a mor-
ally justified interest in fulfilling her obligation.28 For example, a mother has a 
moral duty to care for her child, and thus she has a justified interest in caring 
for her child. And this extends to other forms of obligations: I have a moral obli-
gation not to deliberately kill another person, and hence, I have a justified in-
terest in not having to deliberately kill another person. Of course, there might be 
agents who have a moral obligation to do something, but who do not want to do 
what they are obligated to do; agents who, in other words, show no interest in 
fulfilling their obligations. But such cases do not speak against the general 
claim that, if a person has a moral obligation to do something, and if she wants 
to fulfill her obligation, she has a justified interest in doing so. 
A morally justified interest of a person to fulfill her obligations grounds 
moral duties on behalf of other persons.29 Some of these are positive duties, that 
|| 
28 In what follows, I draw from ideas that have been formulated by Leif Wenar 2013. 
29 Here I assume an interest theory of rights. For such a theory, see, among others, Raz 1989 
and Brighouse, Swift 2014. However, I do not argue for a general correlativity of rights and 
duties. Discussing such a correlativity thesis is outside the scope of this article. Clearly, not 
every duty implies a right on behalf of others (Raz 1989, 7). But if we follow John Stuart Mill 
and think that “[t]o have a right […] is […] to have something which society ought to defend me 
in the possession of” (Mill 1969, 250), then rights are defined at least partly in terms of the 
duties of others. I have no space to discuss these conceptual questions here, and I do not make 
the strong claim that rights and duties necessarily imply each other. Rather, I make the as-
sumption that persons who have a moral duty have a right to act accordingly, and I take this 
claim to be fairly uncontroversial. It must be noted that this is not equivalent to a right to fulfill 
one’s obligations; morality might include competitive elements, where my fulfilling a duty 
(say, to secure a good for my child) prevents you from fulfilling your obligation (say, securing 
the same good for your child). I thank an anonymous referee for making me aware of the need 
to discuss the correlativity thesis. 
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is, duties to help that person in fulfilling her obligations. The public support of 
parents can be understood along these lines. Such positive duties might be 
controversial, but what seems uncontroversial is that the morally justified inter-
est of a person in fulfilling her obligations grounds the negative duties of other 
agents not to deliberately interfere with her in ways that hinder her in fulfilling 
her obligations. If you know that your colleague needs to pick up his children 
from school, it would be wrong to deliberately set a meeting at that time if alter-
natives are available, given that in doing so, you hinder your colleague from 
fulfilling his obligations as a father. And, of course, this extends to other kinds 
of moral obligations. For example, agents have a moral obligation not to create 
avoidable moral dilemmas for others, because moral dilemmas just consist in 
agents not being able to fulfill all of their obligations. 
Taken together, these considerations explain both the ground and the con-
tent of the duties of patients to doctors. Doctors have duties to their patients 
that exist in virtue of their relationship, such as the aforementioned duties of 
beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, and respect. The patient figures not only 
in the content of these duties – the doctor has a duty to act beneficially on be-
half of her patient – but also in the direction of the doctor’s duties, as the doctor 
owes fulfillment of his duties to the patient, rather than to some third party. 
These points are not equivalent: if I promise my friend to take his daughter to 
the zoo, then his daughter figures in the content of my duty (I ought to take her 
to the zoo), but I owe fulfillment of the duty to my friend, since he is the one to 
whom I gave the promise. Hence, if I fail to take my friend’s daughter to the zoo, 
I am not necessarily wronging her – I am wronging my friend. But in the case of 
doctors and patients, the patient not only appears in the content of the doctor’s 
duties, he is also the party towards whom the duties are directed. 
Since the patient figures in the content of the doctor’s duties as well as in 
their direction, the patient’s behavior influences the doctor’s ability to fulfill his 
various role obligations. For example, a patient who worsens his condition be-
cause he does not follow important advice given by the doctor makes it more 
difficult for the doctor to reconcile his duties to act beneficently towards his 
patient, and to respect his autonomy; similarly, a patient who does not show up 
to scheduled appointments makes it more difficult for the doctor to distribute 
her resources – including her time – justly among her patients.30 
|| 
30 At this point, the duty of the members of a health care system to keep healthcare costs as 
low as possible becomes evident: the doctor’s duty of justice assumes a normatively relevant 
scarcity of resources, given that questions of justice arise only in conditions of moderate scar-
city, and this in turn generates questions concerning the proper allocation of scarce resources 
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 19.03.19 16:52
 The Duty of the Patient to Cooperate | 21 
  
Hence, the patient can make it easier or more difficult for the doctor to ful-
fill his moral obligations to the patient by cooperating or not cooperating. And 
this creates a role obligation of the patient to cooperate with the doctor – a mor-
al role obligation, given that it is grounded in a justified interest of the doctor to 
fulfill her moral role obligations. This duty includes, but is not limited to, the 
duty to keep appointments and to be honest about one’s condition; a duty to 
keep resources to a minimum; a duty to advance one’s recovery; and a duty to 
follow the doctor’s advice, as long as this can be reasonably demanded.31 
Accordingly, patients have moral role obligations that apply to them as pa-
tients. These obligations are grounded in the fact that doctors have moral role 
obligations to their patients and a justified interest in fulfilling these obliga-
tions. Doctors’ duties are duties directed to patients, and similarly, patients’ 
duties are duties directed to doctors. However, there is an important difference 
between the duties of patients and doctors. The duties of doctors are free-
standing in a certain sense: they exist independently of the duty of the patients. 
But the duties of patients are derivative of the duties of the doctors: the ra-
tionale for their duties is to not hinder the doctor in fulfilling their moral role 
obligations as doctors or to not create avoidable moral dilemmas for them. In a 
way, then, the role obligations of the patient stem not only from the social role 
of a patient, but also from the social role of a doctor – or more specifically, they 
stem from the moral role obligations of the doctor. Hence, the roles of doctor 
and patient not only depend on each other ontologically – they also do so nor-
matively. And this explains the duties of patients.32 
|| 
– and arguably a reciprocal duty on the part of members of a healthcare system not to waste 
any of the scarce resources that could be used to benefit other members. But even if such a 
background duty exists, it does not account fully for the normativity of the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
31 It might not be possible to determine completely out of context when following the doctor’s 
advice can be reasonably demanded, but certain cases seem to be clear: failing to take one’s 
medicine simply because one does not feel like it certainly amounts to an objectionable form of 
failing to follow the doctor’s advice; by contrast, certain religious beliefs might be weighty 
reasons that justify not doing so. 
32 One might think that this argument leads to the consequence of doctors conveying their 
duties to patients. In times of an increasing juridification of the doctor-patient relationship, 
there is a danger of doctors letting their patients confirm the legitimacy of their actions, inde-
pendent of the actual quality of the treatment. The worry might be that if fulfillment of the 
doctors’ duties is what grounds patients’ duties, doctors might merely be motivated to ensure 
confirmation of the fulfillment of their obligations, whatever they are. But this would be a 
misunderstanding of the view proposed here. Patients’ duties are justified because by cooper-
ating, they help doctors to fulfill their obligations. But the aim of patients’ duties is not to help 
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It must be emphasized that patients have a moral duty to cooperate with the 
doctor, not a duty of obedience. Patients’ duties are duties not to hinder doctors 
in fulfilling their obligations. But this means that patients’ duties only exist as 
long as doctors fulfill their role obligations. If a doctor fails to fulfill his obliga-
tions to the patient, the patient’s cooperation is not mandatory for the fulfill-
ment of the doctor’s duties. After all, those obligations are not fulfilled, anyway. 
A duty of obedience would imply following the doctor’s advice even in situa-
tions in which the patient has good reason to believe that the doctor does not 
fulfill his obligations. It would imply not questioning the doctor’s decisions at 
all. A duty of cooperation is different: it leaves open (and can even require) the 
patient to be critical and possibly scrutinize whether the doctor fulfills his obli-
gations. Patients ought to cooperate with the doctor, but not obey her. 
6 Concluding remarks 
Patients are not only bearers of moral rights, but also of moral duties. One im-
portant duty is the duty to cooperate with the doctor. This duty derives from the 
moral duties of the doctor: the rationale for this duty is the justified interest of 
the doctor in fulfilling her moral role obligations. By not cooperating, the pa-
tient can hinder the doctor from fulfilling her obligations and might even create 
avoidable moral dilemmas for her. Hence, he has a duty to cooperate. 
To a certain degree, this duty is already recognized within treatment con-
tracts. Such contracts usually involve a section concerning the client’s respon-
sibilities, and these responsibilities resemble the duty to cooperate as identified 
in this paper. In a way, then, the argument presented here is a moral justifica-
tion for demanding the patient’s compliance. And this might have important 
practical consequences: some moral duties are the proper object of juridical 
laws, and therefore also legal duties. If patients do in fact have a moral obliga-
tion to cooperate, there might also be grounds to establish legal procedures that 
enforce the patient’s accountability for not cooperating with the doctor, and to 
establish legal duties to cooperate too. 
|| 
doctors fulfill their obligations in the abstract. Rather, the aim is to help doctors act on those 
considerations that actually ground their obligations. Patients ought to cooperate because by 
doing so, they help doctors to act justly or beneficently, rather than to fulfill an obligation that 
happens to be to act justly or beneficently. I thank an anonymous referee for raising this objec-
tion. 
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This, however, is only a tentative claim. It needs much more philosophical 
work to determine whether the moral duty of patients to cooperate should be 
turned into a legal obligation as well. There are good reasons to be skeptical 
here. After all, as mentioned, the patient’s duty to cooperate does not hold abso-
lutely, because, again, the duty to cooperate does not amount to a duty of obe-
dience. One reason has already been mentioned: a duty of obedience would 
hold even if the doctor did not fulfill her role obligations. By contrast, the duty 
to cooperate does not hold in cases in which the doctor does not fulfill her obli-
gations: given that it derives from the obligations of the doctor, it only holds on 
the condition that the doctor actually fulfills her obligations. The duty to coop-
erate can also cease if the doctor is unskilled or mistaken about the best course 
of action; as soon as the patient has good reason to believe that the doctor is 
either unskilled or mistaken, he no longer has a duty to cooperate. Given that 
patients’ duties derive from doctors’ duties, and that doctors’ duties aim at pro-
tecting the specific vulnerability of patients, it follows that the patient has no 
duty to cooperate if the doctor fails to protect the patient’s vulnerability.33 
But there is another reason why the duty to cooperate does not turn into a 
duty of obedience: the autonomy of the patient. A duty of obedience would 
greatly conflict with the patient’s autonomy, which is an important moral good 
– after all, the patient’s autonomy is the reason why patients are bearers of 
moral obligations in the first place. Assigning patients moral duties emphasizes 
their moral status as autonomous beings, not just as helpless persons who rely 
on others. This can help to retrieve their dignity – in the eyes of others, but most 
importantly, in their own.34 
|| 
33 At this point, one might ask for criteria to determine when a doctor fails to fulfill his obliga-
tions, or when he is unskilled or mistaken. This might be especially pressing in times when 
patients can google their symptoms and come to an often unjustified conclusion that the doctor 
is mistaken. I cannot offer a decisive general criterion for good reasons to believe that the 
doctor is mistaken here, and I am not sure that a general criterion can be given. But some 
general remarks are possible. First, if the doctor does not listen to the patient and fails to take 
him seriously, he fails to respect the patient’s autonomy, thereby violating one of his duties. In 
such a case, the patient might have good reason to believe that the doctor did not take all 
relevant considerations into account when making his decision. Second, as Søren Holm has 
argued, especially in the case of chronic diseases, the patient, rather than the doctor, might be 
the expert on her disease and its specific manifestations (Holm 1993, 109). In such a case, a 
patient might come to a justified judgment that the prescriptions of the doctor merely follow 
some standard procedure that does not fit her specific case, and in such a case, her duty to 
cooperate might cease as well. I thank an anonymous referee for making me aware of the need 
to discuss this question. 
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